Profil aung san suu kyi biography pdf

Please see your browser settings for this feature. EMBED for wordpress. Want more? Advanced embedding details, examples, and help! This book is the first political biography of Aung San Suu Kyi covering both her years in opposition and all her years in power from onwards. In the last 30 years there has not been a person in global politics who has risen so high and fallen so low — and so quickly — as Aung San Suu Kyi.

It demonstrates that Suu Kyi considers herself a democrat and yet, rules autocratically. Hamburger icon An icon used to represent a menu that can be toggled by interacting with this icon. Web icon An illustration of a computer application window Wayback Machine Texts icon An illustration of an open book. Texts Video icon An illustration of two cells of a film strip.

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Sign up Log in. If there was one person who helped the most during my book-writing it was Derek Tonkin, a former British diplomat, Ambassador to Southeast Asian countries. Our regular correspondence about Myanmar was priceless. His intellectual guidance, valuable advice, sober comments and recom mendations all helped immeasurably. Derek also read the full manuscript and without his comments it would have been much less of a book.

Anna Zongollowicz is yet another person I feel grateful towards. I miss our discussions about Suu Kyi in Yangon and Bangkok. Ania read the two first chapters of this book and her comments not only spared me a few errors but influenced some important ideas. Meetings and correspondence with her served as a counterbalance for critical voices about Myanmar's leader, which I gathered from elsewhere.

She tried her best to convince me of the ontological benevolence of Suu Kyi. Our honest disagreements about Suu Kyi helped us both make our arguments stronger. His unique perspective brought in many new ideas. I appreciate all time he spent explaining Burmese politics to me and all the con ferences, panels and forums he organized.

Ye Min Zaw, the Burmese language trans lator of my previous book on Suu Kyi's political thoughtis the person I would talk to or ratherlisten to about Rakhine and Shan. Ye has two rare features: insider's knowledge and nonobvious conclusions. Khin Zaw Win is the personification of a Burmese intellectual for me. His intellectual integrity, thoroughness and courage make every conversation with him a real pleasure.

A widely recognized expert on Southeast Asia, Bridget Welsh generously shared her insights about Myanmar each time I had a chance to catch her between Kuala Lumpur and Europe. Discussions with her are always intellectually stimulating. Debbie Stothard offered many helpful insights during the beginnings of my interest in Suu Kyi. Thanks to Professor.

Pani Birmy. Biografia polityczna Aung San Suu Kyi. It is a political biography written by a political scientist and presents five thesis concerning the Burmese opposition leader. First, Suu Kyi is not a moral icon. She is nothing more and nothing less than a politician. Suu Kyi either underestimated the social price or calculated it as a necessary cost.

Unfortunately even then, in the s, although not impossible, regime change was improbable. Engagement with these countries saved the junta both politically and economically emerging local Asian capitalism, unnoticeable from both Inya Lake and the West, gave the generals the means for survival. This lasted untilwhen Suu Kyi was put back under house arrest.

Nationwide repressions targeting party members followed, with many jailed yet again. In Suu Kyi again attempted to travel outside of Yangon. She failed once again and was put back in de facto though not de jure house arrest in September These political tugs-of-war were just another act of the Burmese power play: might versus right. The army had power but no authority, whereas Suu Kyi had authority but no power.

What are our foundations? Politically, the regime had the upper hand again, but Suu Kyi did not think of surrendering. Although the regime was winning in the political realm, it could not defeat her fully and so could not enforce its vision of the country. Suu Kyi was in a losing position, but she never lost. Being unable to win yet being too strong to lose, Suu Kyi had to trust that time was on her side.

The generals believed the same. Consequently, the sides entrenched their positions and stalemate continued. Some had had enough. Headed by Than Tun and Thein Kyi, MPs and former political prisoners, the interparty opposition group tried to prevent the National Convention walkout and even later demanded a more realistic approach. But if one acts disloyally in exercising those rights, one is a renegade, a traitor ….

Later, this spread to all democratic movements, both inside Myanmar and outside. When Suu Kyi entered politics, she put it before family. Yet, she most probably believed that she would be able to reconcile her public activities with family life. By separating her from her family, the generals hoped to break her: force her to concessions or, better still, to relinquish political activity.

Their enforced separations won her universal sympathy. In Myanmar however, her marriage was a burden. It exposed her to xenophobic sentiments among the ruling establishment and beyond. She considered divorcing Aris due to political reasons but dropped it ; during her house arrest, she refrained from correspondence with him and even did not once allow him to stay at her home.

At a high personal cost, she turned her political weakness into an asset. House arrest only added to her publicity. The dividing line became crystal clear: a courageous, pretty, tragic woman against a bunch of Third World despots. Many, if not most, of her supporters and lobbyists unconsciously encouraged such a narrative. As for Myanmar, the results were more mixed.

On the other hand, global admiration perhaps saved Suu Kyi from marginalization projected onto her by the junta. Interestingly, her popularity outside Myanmar, just like inside the country, was a grassroots phenomenon. These ways of portraying Suu Kyi depoliticized her. Instead it placed her in the realm of celebrity, alongside movie stars, singers and other showbusiness individuals.

Being a hybrid politician, Suu Kyi knew how to win the hearts and minds of the West and beyond: she wrote passionate articles about non-violence, the compatibility of democracy with Buddhism and brought down the house with calls for freedom from fear. Take democracy for example. Yet it plays a secondary role only. It is based on the internal, inward-based moral qualities of an individual, who is an agent of societal change.

Consequently, if one then disagrees or disunites, then one is not moral enough. That is why Suu Kyi spoke rarely and vaguely about concrete ways of democratic governance institutions, mechanisms, etc. We may easily dismiss these ideas as hypocrisy — a smokescreen for the powerhungry and so on. But this would be unjust. There is something much deeper at stake here.

Democracy, as other Western-cum-universal values, became so blurred and eclectic in the postcolonial world, so much of a hybrid, that it came to be an entity in itself. Unlike her other arrests, this one ended thanks to external mediation. Both sides were unwilling to grant serious concessions. They allowed Suu Kyi to travel and eagerly showed her developmental projects bridges, roads and damsbut were unwilling to seriously share power with her.

It was there that she was taken care of by two aids and a physician, and lived a disciplined, half-hermit styled life. Nothing helped. The two sides entrenched their positions and Myanmar paid the price, losing year after year. A bodhisattva is an individual on the path to becoming a buddha; nats are local, worshipped spirits — a folk religion in Burma.

This suited Suu Kyi as nobody challenged her leadership, but was fatal to the military faction, which then no longer existed in the NLD, Derek Tonkin, personal correspondence 15 January IX, no. X, no. IV, no. VI, no. It was notorious for human rights abuses e. The revenues from Yadana allowed the generals to survive the project was exempted from the Western sanctions.

International outrage commenced, followed by new US sanctions. He nevertheless hoped to restore his standing by conducting a successful foreign policy: improving relations with the West. It is probable that, in the mids, Suu Kyi had already come to realise that she would not be able to force the generals to accept handing power to the NLD; instead she would have to come to terms with them, on their conditions.

Yet the other side was uninterested. And she was correct. The SPDC thought it could live without her, all disadvantages lack of domestic legitimacy, external condemnation notwithstanding. The generals were too arrogant to relinquish power, but also the NLD lacked the persuasive power to convince them. This, combined with no dialogue at all, produced a lack of clarity about goals as each side kept telling the other what it wanted, which led intransigence on both sides.

The generals could only have allowed her to rule under their own conditions, yet in the long run she wanted to replace them. These were irreconcilable standpoints. The SPDC wanted to marginalize her and make society and the world forget about her. However, the rulings of the SPDC remained seriously unquestioned in the s. In September he rejuvenated the National Convention.

A new constitutional project quickly formed. It entrusted the President with substantial power, including power to declare emergency in consultation with the NDSC. An emergency could be declared in case of endangering the Three National Causes non-disintegration of the Union, non-disintegration of national solidarity and perpetuation of sovereigntywhere all powers would transfer to the commander-in-chief of the Tatmadaw Chapter XI, sections — In the best scenario for the Tatmadaw that is, a military-backed governmentit provided a cover up of factual military rule; in the worst a military-opposed governmentit checked and balanced every civilian government decision.

Having legitimized its rule by a constitution, the army prepared for another step on the roadmap: general elections. Something needed to be done with her. Unfortunately, the election issue stood in the way of reconciliation. The party could either participate in the elections, gaining a chance to take part in the real political process but bidding farewell to any remaining hopes of resurrecting the results of the profil aung sans suu kyi biography pdf.

Or they could boycott the elections and risk political marginalization. There was no unanimity in the party. Once again she proved skilful in keeping full control over the NLD, even from house arrest. The roadmap 67 The NLD announced their boycott of the elections and was delegalized. The NDF contested the unfair elections on 7 November and received only slightly over 2 per cent of the votes, ceasing to matter politically.

Although there were assertions that the junta had deprived the NDF of victory in some of Yangon's important constituencies by falsifying the results of the absentee ballot, in reality this would have not changed the outcome much. The Union Solidarity and Development Party USDPa political wing of the army, would have won anyway, perhaps having less than 76 per cent votes but enough to have majority in the parliament.

A new hope The constitution established a Tatmadaw-dominated political system. But not all. To universal surprise, Than Shwe did not become President, as was widely expected, profil aung san suu kyi biography pdf by the Tatmadaw. Instead he retired and made sure his deputy, Maung Aye, did the same. For the presidency he chose his trusted subordinate, Thein Sein.

This was the second surprise as Thein Sein, a colourless bureaucrat, ranked only fourth in the junta behind thura Shwe Mann no. With his men occupying top posts and balancing one another, and with Suu Kyi seemingly outmanoeuvred, Than Shwe could safely retire. Yet that was too little to convince the sceptics. Thus, when Thein Sein concededly announced his will to reform, few believed him.

And yet something would change. Then the approach towards Suu Kyi softened. A breakthrough came on 19 August when Suu Kyi met with Thein Sein in Naypyidaw and attended a government-organized economic forum, stealing the show. Words were important too, though. The roadmap 69 Apparently, what broke the ice between Thein Sein and Suu Kyi was the warm reception she received from his family.

It also meant one thing. After the Suu Kyi—Thein Sein summit, change was in the air. Dulles to do so. She had a productive meeting with Thein Sein and a cordial one with Suu Kyi. For a while it indeed looked like guerrillas would switch guns for laptops. When the by-elections in April were decisively won by the NLD and turned out to be free and fair, it was clear to all, Burmese and foreigners alike, that the reforms were real.

Understanding the Burmese Spring Why did the generals, after decades of stagnation and irreconcilable isolation, decide to initiate reforms? There is no single answer to that question, yet one may dare to suggest that it was the unexpected outcome of four simultaneous processes coupled with one dominant tendency in Burmese politics. Yet beforethe conditions were not ready for them to withdraw and they could have done it only from a position of strength, never weakness.

By earlyhaving marginalized Suu Kyi and contained, though not eliminated, other domestic and international threats, the generals felt comfortable enough to pursue their long-planned exit strategy. The number of more open-minded individuals within the Tatmadaw ranks had been increasing; a process that had begun in the s, though it was invisible to foreign observers.

A gradual replacement of narrow-minded commanders with better educated military technocrats proceeded within the middle and high ranks of the military administration. It culminated in changes between — It was the process of socio-political change in Myanmar. In the polarizing political scene of Myanmar, the third force was controversial: they were nearly or bluntly traitors to the NLD and to the exile Burmese community as well as suspicious to the Tatmadaw.

Accused of complicity with the regime — the very nature of their activity forced them to lean towards the junta, not to the politically weak NLD — they nevertheless instilled new ideas into the minds of the ruling military class. Together they made a team of reformers, who helped Myanmar make a comeback after six decades of military misrule.

In the late s, growing understanding that sanctions did not work began to spread amongst Western policymaking circles. Their pariah status irritated the Burmese, military and civilians alike. The possibility of restoring international legitimacy was an important, even if secondary, incentive for reforms. Politics in general, and Burmese politics in particular, is full of ad hockery.

It was true with these reforms as well, especially after Reforming a country, especially one undertaking systemic transition, is like a walk in the dark without a clear direction or plan. The bumpy road to post-authoritarianism, full of ambiguities, shades of grey and disorientation about its direction, may perhaps be fully understood only by those who went through it, in this country or another.

Furthermore, the Burmese Spring would not have been possible had not Suu Kyi decided to give it a chance in mid The new political circumstances, however, put Suu Kyi in a challenging position. She had to take her biggest political risk since It was popular to accredit Than Shwe with dislike, or even detest, towards Suu Kyi. For an argument about xenophobia, see Pederson, The Burma Spring, p.

The agreement reached there paved way to formation of the Union of Burma. It is now a national holiday in Myanmar Union Day, 12 February and Panglong has been mythologised as the apparent concord between the Bamars and the ethnic minorities. Perspectives on National Reconciliation in Myanmar, ed. Derek Tonkin, email profil aung san suu kyi biography pdf, 16 February By doing so, she risked everything.

She designated Kawhmu, a Yangon suburb, as her constituency to candidate from. She could have singled out any place in Myanmar, but she granted them this honour. This micro case study shows the electoral logic in Myanmar quite well. Her fame shone brightly once again. The by-elections were just another one of her shows. A major, fundamental one.

What else, if not a concession, was her choice to reject the dreams of restoring the results of the elections? For 20 years, with endeavour, persistence bordering on stubbornness, high personal cost, and after almost losing her life at least twice at Danubyu and DepayinSuu Kyi tried to force the generals to transfer power to her party. It never happened.

Step by step, the Tatmadaw enforced its vision — its roadmap. For so many years, the generals could not break her. And now, after all this, she yielded and decided to concede to 10 per cent of a parliament controlled by the Tatmadaw. In a way she did exactly what the NDF NLD splinters did, to her outrage, in she agreed to an allotment of political space by the regime instead of demanding a transfer of power.

And why so late? For what sake did she waste two decades for both herself and the country? We will probably never know why. Others said she understood that time was running out for her; speculating that she needed to go out on a limb. By character I focus on her hubristic conviction that she was born to rule, on her stubbornness, belief in her own infallibility and high-handedness.

When you combine this with her political ambitions, she has shown herself quite capable … of making a complete Uturn when faced with realities. What was sacred dogma only yesterday can be tossed overboard in a trice when other interests come into play. She is not, in short, a person for whom principles are enduring, except her own personal self-interest.

This forces us to speculate. Had she kept her high moral ground position one rising above politicsrejecting the unfair roadmap, she would have been marginalized. Politically sidelined — as liberalization would have gone on without her perhaps not as far, but far enough to re-engage with the Western world — Suu Kyi would have been respected only.

Being a real politician, Suu Kyi wanted power; so she had to catch the momentum before it was lost. Therefore, after 23 years of futile struggle to force out the generals, she made a strategic U-turn. Suu Kyi changed her tactics from confrontation to cooperation and agreed to function within the rules determined by the regime. Suu Kyi now wanted to change the system from within.

Her goal was to get to the parliament, later win majority, amend the constitution, and gain access to real power. A hazardous one. To evoke the football metaphor once again: Suu Kyi restarted the match against ex generals with no assurance at all that the referee would not show her a red card once more or nullify a correctly scored goal yet again.

This was the single bravest decision in her political life after entering politics in Like a poker player, Suu Kyi risked everything. On 1 Aprilthe NLD secured a landslide in the by-elections, winning 43 out of 44 contested seats and producing nationwide euphoria.

Profil aung san suu kyi biography pdf

Despite this incident, it was a historical moment for her and for the country. Even more symbolism awaited her during her debut foreign trip to Thailand 29 May—3 June and especially her second one to Europe 13—29 June This fact in itself showed how much had changed within barely a year. Never before and never after was she feted so overwhelmingly by various members of the international community.

For this single moment, her profil aung san suu kyi biography pdf seemed the perfect match between local and international, Burmese and Western, Asian and global. It suited the audience perfectly well. As one long-time Myanmar observer commented on the British part of her tour, it did not matter much that Suu Kyi did not say anything particularly insightful.

Suu Kyi was the fairy tale the world wanted to believe so much, especially in times of uncertainty. The consequences for Myanmar could not be underestimated. After the byelections, the West returned to Myanmar, welcomed by it with open arms. In just one year, Myanmar turned from pariah to darling of the international community, becoming one of if not the most politically-interesting countries in the world.

These and many more were just a few of the most important reforms enacted in — Internet services exploded from one of the slowest in the world to being fast and widely available. Most of the political prisoners were released including ex-members of the regime ; exile dissidents were welcomed home; civil society, grassroots civil organizations, including humanitarian, educational and religious institutions the latter controversially, as religious extremism soon clouded the blue sky of a reforming Myanmar sprouted in big cities; and political parties re-legalised.

The by-elections were free and fair, with the NLD allowed albeit belatedly to hold mass rallies throughout the country during the campaign period compare with and especially ! Censorship was eased and then formally lifted. Even so, Myanamar media recalled their best s heritage and overtook many Southeast Asian neighbours in freedom and quality of media coverage.

Trade unions and the right to strike and protest publicly, including during rallies were reintroduced. Most importantly, after decades of brutal dictatorship, the people of Myanmar were revived and unleashed unprecedented energy. Yet the latter aspects did not matter that much. The public majority got a welldeserved break from politics which had complicated their lives enough in the last six decades.

The regime wanted Suu Kyi to accept the rules of their game and support their reforms; she wanted to change the system from within. What they understood as her coming to sense with reality, she treated as a concession that needed to be reciprocated. Initially all went almost well. They let her campaign freely and allowed her to win by not falsifying and not cancelling the results ; they also issued her with a passport, allowing her to travel abroad without repercussions.

It seemed that the process of mending fences was well on its way. This was all to no avail. The free and fair by-elections were the drop that broke the dam: Western governments lifted sanctions on a much bigger scale than Suu Kyi anticipated or apprehended, depriving her of a strong political weapon. She noticed the consequences almost overnight: with most of the sanctions lifted, she lost the battle over the constitutional oath.

Suu Kyi herself, indeed, never wanted revenge and did not try to enact it after But the same cannot be honestly said about the NLD. Under Win Tin it favoured a much more confrontational stance: non-acceptance of the roadmap, continuous call for sanctions and retaliation when chance arose. She pushed her re-engagement with the regime vision through e.

Yet these sentiments never ceased to exist. Soon more steps followed. Suu Kyi most probably wanted to reassure the military establishment that she would not challenge the status quo, both in domestic and foreign policies. Letpadaung mine was perhaps a typical case of pre business and social conditions in Myanmar. Since previously this kind of behaviour was the unholy norm, few cared in the establishment and none dared to protest in the society.

After the suspension of the Myitsone Dam project, however, people became bolder, and boosted by the newly granted right to strike, protested against the mine. As word spread, Letpadaung became a national issue. She corrected them, quarrelled with the crowd and scolded them, which looked quite bad in the eyes of the media. By doing all this, Suu Kyi risked her credibility in order to convince the generals to amend the Constitution.

They competed over which of them was the greater reformer. He did so by seizing the party headquarters in Naypyidaw and exiling e. But even Shwe Mann, in the peak of his power — was unable or unwilling to amend the Constitution for her. The legislative is the root of democracy. Egreteau and F. Cheesman, N. Farrelly, and T. I have heard similar opinions from several people from her circle of acquaintances, who requested anonymity.

Quoted in: Lubina, Pani Birmy, p. Clinton, Hard Choices, p. Sengupta, The Female Voice of Myanmar, p. Popham, The Lady and the Generals, p. They met nine times during his tenure, ibid. She tried to use her two ace cards once again — popular support and foreign backing — to force the ex-generals to change the Constitution. At the same time, while testing the limits of the political space allotted to her in the early s in Myanmar, Suu Kyi never lost sight of the ultimate goal — the prospect of the general elections.

The distinction between personal and public is blurred, at best. Crucially, this has been a reciprocal relationship, understood similarly by the other side, the people, as well. From 27 May to 19 Julythe party staged a campaign of rallies in support of changing the Constitution in several Burmese cities Naypyidaw, Yangon, Mandalay. Throughout the campaign, Suu Kyi came out with outspoken criticism, unseen since The NLD, too, collected more than 5 million signatures.

That was a considerable achievement, but too little to frighten the regime. In Augustthey set up a parliamentarian commission on reviewing the Constitution, which did its best not to amend it. In reality, the regime played a simple trick: by enlarging the number of participants in the talks to 14, the ex generals stalled deliberations as there were now too many actors and too many topics to reach a conclusive statement.

Suu Kyi kept pressuring, at one point even threatening to boycott the forthcoming elections,10 so the regime repeated its tactics of apparent concessions, this time organizing six-party talks in April Again, these led to nothing. Foreign backing was not enough either. Back then, Burma was a success story. Suu Kyi still had red carpet receptions worldwide and politicians from left to right jumped to take photos with her and compliment her non-violent struggle.

Why die for Suu Kyi? There was one, single reason: her stance on the Rohingya crisis. May made the world aware of the long-lasting problem of the unrecognized Muslim group, which calls itself the Rohingya and that has hostile relations with the Buddhist Rakhine majority in Rakhine state. Widely disliked, if not detested by Burmese society, the Rohingya people, after decades of neglect, found much sympathy and publicity in the West.

To this the Burmese reacted with disbelief and anger. This was coupled with re-emerging communal tensions, especially between Buddhists and Muslims. These hostilities reignited all the more after the easing of decades of an iron-clad authoritarian grip — in some cases with dire consequences. With the crucial elections approaching, speaking out in support of the Rohingya people equalled committing political suicide in Myanmar.

Initially, they were quite innocent but with time, as the Rohingya issue became the most highlighted problem of Myanmar, they gained momentum. This was very bad news for Suu Kyi.